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A NOTE ON STRONG AXIOMATIZATION OF GO¨DEL-JUSTIFICATION LOGIC
NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Abstract. Justification Logics are special kinds of modal logics which provide a framework for reasoning about
epistemic justification. For this, they extend classical boolean propositional logic by a family of necessity-style
modal operators “t :“, indexed over t by a corresponding set of justification terms, which thus explicitly encode
the justification for the necessity assertion in the syntax. With these operators, one can therefore not only
reason about modal effects on propositions but also about dynamics inside the justifications themselves. We
replace this classical boolean base with Go¨del logic, one of the three most prominent fuzzy logics, i.e. special
instances of many-valued logics, taking values in the unit interval [0, 1], which are intended to model inference
under vagueness. We extend the canonical possible-world semantics for Justification Logic to this fuzzy realm
by considering fuzzy accessibility- and evaluation-functions evaluated over the minimum t-norm and establish
strong completeness theorems for various fuzzy analogies of prominent extensions for basic Justification Logic.
1. Introduction
Epistemology and its core notions like knowledge, belief, truth and justification have, since Hintikka’s sem-
inal work [24], found natural formalizations in the realm of modal logics and in their fundamental semantical
interpretation over Kripke’s possible-world models. The formal development of Justification Logic began with
the so called logic of proofs which extends basic propositional logic by a family of modal, necessity-style unary
operators, introducing formulas of the form t : φ, where the indexing parameter t ranges over a corresponding
set of proof terms. This logic was devised by Artemov in [1], [2], to provide an arithmetic provability semantics
for intiutionistic logic and bridge intuitionistic logic, the modal logic S4 and formal arithmetic, a possibility
anticipated by Go¨del in [21], [22] where he provided an embedding of intuitionistic logic into S4 and conceptu-
alized the provability interpretation of the modality  in S4. However, an explicit embedding of S4 into formal
arithmetic was still left out. The missing link was then provided by the logic of proofs LP , for which Artemov
provided an embedding into formal arithmetic via the Arithmetic Completeness Theorem and an embedding of
S4 into LP via Artemov’s Realization Theorem, assigning explicit proof terms to necessity-statements, which
forms an intricate relation between classical modal logics and Justification Logics.
From a modern perspective, LP is just one of various logical systems in the framework of Justification Logic,
similarly to S4’s position inside the common framework of classical modal logics. Kripke-style possible-world
semantics for the logic of proofs were introduced in [16], [17], with the structures prominently called Fitting-
models, and later naturally extended to the various other representatives of the class of Justification Logics.
As later observed, the Realization Theorem also extends to other representatives of the respective frameworks
of classical modal and Justification Logics. For a comprehensive overview over the framework of Justification
Logics, see e.g. [3].
Go¨del logic on the other hand is a very prominent example of a many-valued logic, with evaluations into the
unit interval [0, 1], dating back to a paper of Go¨del [20] where he introduced finite valued versions to provide an
infinite family of logics between intuitionistic and classical logic with respect to expressive strength. The version
taking values in the unit interval [0, 1] was first studied by Dummett in [11] who also provided the first proof
calculus in terms of a simple extension of a common Hilbert calculus for intuitionistic logic. A first-order variant
of this infinitely-valued version was followingly studied by Horn [25](see also [5]). Besides of this intuitionistic
access to Go¨del logic, a prominent different approach, and the one followed in this paper, is given via the route
of mathematical fuzzy logic, deriving from the concept of fuzzy sets originating in Zadeh’s landmark work [33],
and originating mainly from the seminal monograph of Ha´jek [23]. Semantically, fuzzy logics are defined over
the notion of a t-norm (triangular norm, see e.g. [26]) as a truth function for conjunction, where Go¨del logic
results in the case of considering the minimum t-norm as a particular choice.
From an application perspective, it seems very natural to combine Justification Logics with a notion of
vagueness to model e.g. uncertain epistemic assertions, and thus in a more explicit manner to combine fuzzy
logic and particularly Go¨del logic with Justification Logic in the sense of adding justification modalities to the
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underlying propositional language and evaluating them in a many-valued context. Similarly as fuzzy logic has
proved itself to be one of the right tools to express and analyze vague propositional assertions, we believe that
fuzzy Justification Logic shall be a right tool to model uncertain (explicit) epistemic assertions.
Examples for combinations of Justification Logic with other systems (or notions) of vagueness (or proba-
bility) include Milnikel’s logic of uncertain justifications [29] where Milnikel introduces a graded justification
operator t :r φ for r ∈ Q∩ [0, 1] with the intended meaning of r being the least degree of confidence in “t being
a justification for φ“; and recently also the development of probabilistic Justification Logic, see e.g. [27], and
possibilistic Justification Logic, see e.g. [13].
At the time, the only literature on fuzzy Justification Logics is Ghari’s work in [18] and [19] where he in-
troduced the notion of fuzzy Fitting-models (with a crisp accessibility function) for respective t-norms, here
later redefined for the case of Go¨del logic, and especially investigated the extension of Pavelka-style fuzzy logic.
However, the study of models with graded accessibility functions and the derivation of strong completeness
theorems was still left open in any case.
In this note, we concretisize and expand the work of Ghari in [18] and thus continue to expand the realm
of fuzzy Justification Logics. We focus on Go¨del logics as an underlying base logic and introduce respective
fuzzy Fitting-models with fuzzy accessibility functions. The main part is occupied with the study of fuzzy
analogies of the most prominent Justification Logics and their semantics as well as their axiomatizations where
we establish strong completeness results in every case. To approach this, we translate modality-containing
formulas into an augmented basic propositional language and use the strong standard completeness of the
underlying propositional systems. In general, we heavily rely on various concepts of standard Go¨del modal logic,
i.e. propositional Go¨del logic expanded by a classical necessity and possibility modality  and ♦, originating in
[8],[9] and [10], (studying the necessity and possibility fragments as well as the Bi-model variant respectively),
where especially the structure of our approach to proving strong standard completeness is derived from. For
a comprehensive overview over fuzzy modal logic and related advancements to completeness results for various
modal fuzzy logics over crisp models, see also e.g. [31]. However, we do not recap the main notions from these
works as they will be introduced in their adapted form for the case of fuzzy (Go¨del) Justification Logic during
the note as appropriate. In the end, we give some starting points for directions of future work.
2. Preliminaries
The basis for our further investigations is classical propositional [0, 1]-valued Go¨del logic. Formally, for this
we fix a standard propositional language
L0(X) : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ)
with p ∈ X for a countably infinite set of variables X . We may fix a standard set of propositional variables with
V ar = {pi | i ∈ N}. As an abbreviation, we then also write L0 := L0(V ar). As usual in propositional logics, we
omit the outermost brackets if convenient. Other common connectives are introduced as an abbreviation, i.e.
we set
(1) ¬φ := (φ→ ⊥),
(2) φ↔ ψ := (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ),
(3) φ ∨ ψ := ((φ→ ψ)→ ψ) ∧ ((ψ → φ)→ φ),
(4) ⊤ := (⊥ → ⊥).
Semantics for propositional Go¨del logics are defined via truth value assignments in the unit interval [0, 1], where
conjunction is evaluated over the minimum t-norm min{x, y} for x, y ∈ [0, 1], in the following denoted with
x⊙ y, and implication over its residuum ⇒, that is the unique function ⇒: [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying
x⊙ y ≤ z iff x ≤ y ⇒ z.
In the case of the minimum t-norm, the residuum has the following description:
x⇒ y =
{
y, if x > y
1, otherwise
Definition 2.1. A propositional assignment is a function e : X → [0, 1]. This function can be naturally
extended to a propositional Go¨del evaluation over L0(X) by the following recursive definitions:
• e(⊥) = 0
• e(φ ∧ ψ) = e(φ)⊙ e(ψ)
• e(φ→ ψ) = e(φ)⇒ e(ψ)
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An evaluation e may also be extended to sets of formulas Γ via
e(Γ) = inf{e(φ) | φ ∈ Γ}.
For the derived connectives, simplifying the corresponding evaluations yield the following expressions:
(1) e(¬φ) =
{
1, if e(φ) = 0
0, otherwise
(2) e(φ↔ ψ) =
{
1, if e(φ) = e(ψ)
e(φ)⊙ e(ψ), otherwise
(3) e(φ ∨ ψ) = max{e(φ), e(ψ)}
(4) e(⊤) = 1
The resulting truth functions corresponding to ¬,↔ and ∨ are respectively denoted by ∼,⇔ and ⊕. With
Ev(L0(X)), we denote the set of all evaluations of L0(X) into [0, 1], that is the set of all maps e : X → [0, 1],
extended to L0(X) by the above definition.
Before proceeding with other semantic notions, we want to note some properties of the minimum t-norm ⊙
and its derived functions.
Lemma 2.2. Let x, y, z, x′, y′ ∈ [0, 1]:
(1) If x ≤ x′, y ≤ y′, then x⊙ y ≤ x′ ⊙ y′.
(2) If y ≤ y′, then x⇒ y ≤ x⇒ y′.
(3) If x ≥ x′, then x⇒ y ≤ x′ ⇒ y.
(4) If x ≥ x′, then ∼ x ≤∼ x′.
The proof is very elementary and thus omitted here.
From these definitions regarding semantic evaluations, analogues for the case of Go¨del logic of other common
semantical notions can now be derived.
Definition 2.3. Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X). Then we say that
(1) Γ entails φ, Γ |=≤ φ, iff ∀e ∈ Ev(L0(X)) : e(Γ) ≤ e(φ),
(2) Γ 1-entails φ, Γ |= φ, iff ∀e ∈ Ev(L0(X)) : e(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ implies e(φ) = 1.
However, as observed by Baaz and Zach, these two notions of semantic inference coincide (for countable sets
of premises).
Lemma 2.4 (Baaz, Zach [6]). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X): Γ |=≤ φ iff Γ |= φ.
Through the approach to Go¨del logics via the framework of fuzzy logics, we consider an extension of Ha´jek’s
proof calculus for basic fuzzy logic BL [23] by the idempotency axiom for conjunction as the corresponding
proof calculus for axiomatizing the above defined semantic consequence relation of basic propositional Go¨del
logic.
Definition 2.5. Let G be the Hilbert-style calculus given by the following axioms1 and rules:
(A1) : (φ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (φ→ χ))
(A2) : (φ ∧ ψ)→ φ
(A3) : (φ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ φ)
(A5a) : (φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ)
(A5b) : ((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ)→ (φ→ (ψ → χ))
(A6) : ((φ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → φ)→ χ)→ χ)
(A7) : ⊥ → φ
(G4) : φ→ (φ ∧ φ)
(MP ) : From φ and φ→ ψ, infer ψ.
We denote a deduction of φ ∈ L0(X) in G, or from premises Γ ⊆ L0(X), by ⊢G φ and Γ ⊢G φ respectively.
Lemma 2.6 (Ha´jek [23]). G proves the following formulas:
(1) φ→ (ψ → φ)
(2) φ→ φ
(3) (φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
1The numbering follows Ha´jek’s original presentation in [23].
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While item (1) and (2) are even theorems for Ha´jek’s basic logic BL, item (3) is a particular feature of Go¨del
logic, distinguishing it from the other prominent t-norm based logics. This lemma is also the reason for why
the usual proof of the classical deduction theorem works in Go¨del logic.
Theorem 2.7 (Strong Standard Completeness, Ha´jek [23]). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X):
Γ ⊢G φ iff Γ |= φ
3. Go¨del-Fitting models
Definition 3.1. The language of Go¨del justification logic LJ is defined by the BNF
LJ : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ) | t : φ
with p ∈ V ar = {pi | i ∈ N} as before and t ∈ Jt where
Jt : t ::= x | c | [t · t] | [t+ t] | !t | ?t
with x ∈ V = {xi | i ∈ N} a variable symbole and c ∈ C = {ci ∈ N} a constant symbole.
The same rules for simplification of bracketing formulas as well as definitions for derived connectives as
presented in the preliminaries apply here.
In practice, there are many different variants for possible sets of justification terms, with some extensions
and reductions of the set Jt as defined above present. In general, a set of justification terms is expected to at
least contain a countable set of variables and constants as well as to be closed under the · and + operations.
The !-operator, originating from the “initial“ justification logic LP , and the ?-operator, relating to positive and
negative introspection in explicit modal logics respectively, are of greater importance for common extensions
investigated later. There is, however, no disadvantage in allowing them right away.
Definition 3.2. A Go¨del-Justification model (over the language LJ) is a structure M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 with
(1) W being a non-empty set, the domain D(M) (of M),
(2) R :W ×W → [0, 1],
(3) E : Jt× LJ ×W → [0, 1],
(4) e :W × V ar → [0, 1],
where E satisfies the closure conditions2
(i) E(t, φ→ ψ,w) ⊙ E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t · s, ψ, w),
(ii) E(t, φ, w) ⊕ E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t+ s, φ, w),
for all t, s ∈ Jt, φ, ψ ∈ LJ and w ∈ W . The class of all Go¨del-Justification models is denoted by GJ. We say
that a Go¨del-Justification model is (simply) finite if W is finite.
These models are inspired by Go¨del-Kripke models, originally introduced in [8], [9], which form a similar
fuzzy possbile-world semantics for standard modal Go¨del logics.3
We extend the evaluation function e of a GJ-model from V ar to the whole language LJ via the following
inductive rules, for each world w ∈ W :
• e(w,⊥) = 0
• e(w, φ ∧ ψ) = e(w, φ) ⊙ e(w,ψ)
• e(w, φ→ ψ) = e(w, φ)⇒ e(w,ψ)
• e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ infv∈W {R(w, v)⇒ e(v, φ)}
As an abuse of notation, we write e(w,φ) = infv∈W {R(w, v)⇒ e(v, φ)} in connection to classical Go¨del modal
logic [9] although of course φ, that is the classical necessity-style operator  in general, is not part of the
underlying language. Following to this, we may rephrase the definition of the semantic evaluation of t : φ with
e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ).
At a world w in a GJ-model M = 〈W,R, E , e〉, we may also extend e(w, ·) to sets of formulas Γ ⊆ LJ with
setting
e(w,Γ) = inf
ψ∈Γ
{e(w,ψ)}.
A GJ-model M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 is called crisp if R(v, w) ∈ {0, 1} for all v, w ∈ W . For a class of GJ-models C,
we denote the subclass of all crisp models in C by Cc. Similarly to classical Go¨del modal logics, we may now
define the usual semantical notion of (local) satisfiability in a model.
2These conditions represent natural generalizations of the classical conditions on boolean Fitting-models, i.e. restricting E to
{0, 1} returns them in a translated form.
3The concept of many-valued Kripke models in the context of modal logics, especially with many-valued accessbility functions,
was initiated by the work of Fitting in [14], [15] where he studied a variant taking values in a finite lattice.
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Definition 3.3. Let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 be a GJ-model, w ∈ W and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ . We say
(i) M satisfies φ in w, written (M, w) |= φ, iff e(w, φ) = 1,
(ii) φ is valid in M, written M |= φ, iff ∀v ∈W : e(v, φ) = 1,
and similarly for sets Γ
(iii) M satisfies Γ in w, written (M, w) |= Γ, iff ∀ψ ∈ Γ : (M, w) |= ψ,
(iv) Γ is valid in M, written M |= Γ, iff ∀ψ ∈ Γ : M |= ψ.
This yields, similarly to the basic propositional case, two analogues for local semantic inference in modal
logic for fuzzy Fitting-models.
Definition 3.4. Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ and C a class of GJ-models. We say that
(1) Γ entails φ in C, written Γ |=C≤ φ, if ∀M = 〈W,R, e〉 ∈ C : ∀w ∈ W : e(w,Γ) ≤ e(w, φ),
(2) Γ 1-entails φ in C, written Γ |=C φ, if ∀M = 〈W,R, e〉 ∈ C : ∀w ∈W : (M, w) |= Γ implies (M, w) |= φ.
A formula φ is called C-valid, for a class of GJ-models C, if ∅ |=C φ. In this case, we also just write |=C φ.
Lemma 3.5. For any class of GJ-models C and any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ |=C≤ φ implies Γ |=C φ.
Proof. Let C be a class of GJ-models and assume Γ |=C≤ φ. Thus,
∀M ∈ C : ∀w ∈ D(M) : inf
ψ∈Γ
{e(w,ψ)} ≤ e(w, φ).
Now, let w ∈ D(M) for someM ∈ C and suppose (M, w) |= Γ, i.e. ∀ψ ∈ Γ : e(w,ψ) = 1. Thus infψ∈Γ{e(w,ψ)} =
1. By the above, we have 1 = infψ∈Γ{e(w,ψ)} ≤ e(w, φ) ≤ 1, i.e. e(w, φ) = 1 and thus (M, w) |= φ. Thus
Γ |=C φ. 
Lemma 3.6 (Caicedo, Rodriguez [9]). For any GJ-model M, any w ∈ D(M) and any φ, ψ ∈ LJ : e(w,(φ →
ψ)) ⊙ e(w,φ) ≤ e(w,ψ).
By properties of ⊙ and the residuum ⇒, the result may also be rephrased as e(w,(φ→ ψ)) ≤ e(w,φ)⇒
e(w,ψ) for any GJ-model M and w ∈ D(M).
Definition 3.7. Let GJ 0 be the following axiomatic extension of the proof calculus for standard propositional
Go¨del logic G:
(P ) : The axioms of the calculus G.
(J) : t : (φ→ ψ)→ (s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ)
(+) : t : φ→ [t+ s] : φ, s : φ→ [t+ s] : φ
(MP ) : From φ and φ→ ψ, infer ψ.
We denote inference of a formula φ ∈ LJ from a set of formulas Γ ⊆ LJ in this calculus by Γ ⊢GJ 0 φ(or Γ ⊢ φ
if the context is clear).
Proposition 3.8. The schemes (J) and (+) are GJ-valid.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 be a GJ-model and w ∈ W .
(J) : We have e(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ⊙ e(w, s : φ) = (E(t, φ → ψ,w) ⊙ e(w,(φ→ ψ))) ⊙ (E(s, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ)) =
E(t, φ → ψ,w) ⊙ e(w,(φ → ψ)) ⊙ E(s, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ) = (E(t, φ → ψ,w) ⊙ E(s, φ, w)) ⊙ (e(w,(φ →
ψ))⊙e(w,φ)) by commutativity and associativity of ⊙. As E(t, φ→ ψ,w)⊙E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t ·s, ψ, w) by
property (i) on E of a GJ-model and e(w,(φ→ ψ))⊙e(w,φ) ≤ e(w,ψ) by Lem. 3.6, we have through
monotonicity of ⊙: (E(t, φ→ ψ,w)⊙E(s, φ, w))⊙(e(w,(φ → ψ))⊙e(w,φ)) ≤ E(t·s, ψ, w)⊙e(w,ψ) =
e(w, [t · s] : ψ). Thus, e(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ⊙ e(w, s : φ) ≤ e(w, [t · s] : ψ), i.e. by properties of the residuum
e(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ≤ e(w, s : φ)⇒ e(w, [t · s] : ψ) = e(w, s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ).
(+) : We just show the first case, as the second case follows similarly. We have e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w)⊙e(w,φ).
By E(t, φ, w)⊕E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t+ s, φ, w), we have E(t, φ, w) ≤ E(t+ s, φ, w). Thus again by monotinicity
of ⊙, we have E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ) ≤ E(t+ s, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ) = e(w, [t+ s] : φ).

3.1. Constant specifications and internalization. Constant specifications are a weakened implementation
of the principle of logical awareness, i.e. regarding axioms to be self-evidently justified, with weakened in the
sense that we may restrict this view to a corresponding subset of the axioms in question. From a basic practical
point, a constant specification helps an agent to make more justified inference.
6 NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Definition 3.9. For a given proof calculus S, defined over the corresponding language LJ , a constant specifi-
cation is a set CS of formulas of the form
cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : φ (n ≥ 1)
for φ and axiom of S and ci constants for all i = 1, . . . , n. Additionally, a constant specification is expected to
be downward closed, i.e. if cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : φ ∈ CS, then ci : · · · : c1 : φ for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
We call CS axiomatically appropriate, if for each axiom φ of S, there is a constant c ∈ C s.t. c : φ ∈ CS,
and if cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : φ ∈ CS, then cn+1 : cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : φ ∈ CS for some constant cn+1.
Definition 3.10. We say that a Go¨del-Justification model M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 respects a constant specification
CS, if
∀c : φ ∈ CS : ∀w ∈ W : E(c, φ, w) = 1.
For a class C of GJ-models, we denote the subclass of all GJ-models in C respecting a constant specification CS
by CCS.
Definition 3.11. Let CS be a constant specification (for GJ 0). We define GJ CS as GJ 0 extended by the rule
(CS) : From c : φ ∈ CS, infer ⊢ c : φ.
Clearly, GJ 0 relates to GJ ∅. Similarly as propositional Go¨del logic, Go¨del Justification Logic enjoys the
classical deduction theorem, which is a notable exception in comparison to other representatives in the framework
of fuzzy (justification) logic.
Lemma 3.12 (Deduction theorem). Let Γ ∪ {α, φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ ∪ {α} ⊢GJCS φ iff Γ ⊢GJCS α→ φ.
The proof is essentially the same as in the case of classical (Justification) Logic, proceeding via the usual
induction, employing Lem. 2.6, and is thus omitted.
Lemma 3.13. The rule (CS) is valid in the model class GJCS.
Proof. Let cn : · · · : c1 : φ ∈ CS and let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 be a GJ-model respecting CS. Now, as CS is
downward closed, we have ck : · · · : c1 : φ ∈ CS for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
E(ck, ck−1 : · · · : c1 : φ,w) = 1 for all w ∈ W . As φ is an axiom of GJ CS , we have, as all axioms are GJ-valid, that
e(w, φ) = 1 for all w ∈W . Thus, e(w,φ) = 1 for all w ∈W and thus e(w, c1 : φ) = E(c1, φ, w)⊙ e(w,φ) = 1
for all w ∈ W . From this, we have that e(w, c2 : c1 : φ) = E(c2, c1 : φ,w) ⊙ e(w,c1 : φ) = 1. Continuing this
up to n gives e(w, cn : · · · : c1 : φ) = E(cn, cn−1 : · · · : c1 : φ,w)⊙e(w,cn−1 : · · · : c1 : φ) = 1 for all w ∈ W . 
Definition 3.14. We say that GJ CS enjoys internalization, if ⊢GJCS φ implies that there exists a justification
term t ∈ Jt s.t. ⊢GJCS t : φ.
Lemma 3.15 (Lifting lemma). Let CS be axiomatically appropriate. If {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊢GJCS φ, then for any
justification terms t1, . . . , tn ∈ Jt there is a justification term t ∈ Jt s.t. {t1 : ψ1, . . . , tn : ψn} ⊢GJCS t : φ.
The proof of this lemma is strictly similar to the proof in the classical case (see e.g. [2], [28]) and thus omitted
here. The following is a direct consequence of the Lifting lemma.
Lemma 3.16. Let CS be a constant specification: If CS is axiomatically appropriate, then GJ CS enjoys
internalization.
Lemma 3.17 (Soundness of GJ CS). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ ⊢GJCS φ implies Γ |=GJCS≤ φ.
Proof. We have that Γ ⊢GJCS φ implies {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊢GJCS φ for some {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ Γ. By repeated
application of the deduction theorem, we have ⊢GJCS
∧n
i=1 ψi → φ. As of Prop. 3.8, all axioms of GJ CS
are valid. Of course (MP ), and as of Lem. 3.13, also (CS) preserve validity (in GJCS). We thus have |=GJCS∧n
i=1 ψi → φ. Thus, for any GJCS-model M and any w ∈ D(M), we have (M, w) |=
∧n
i=1 ψi → φ, i.e.
e(w,Γ) ≤ e(w,
∧n
i=1 ψi) ≤ e(w, φ), as {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ Γ, i.e. Γ |=GJCS≤ φ. 
4. Modal-type extensions
Similar to the realm of classical modal logic, the framework of classical justification logic spreads out over
numerous extensions of the basic axiomatic system for justifications (similar to GJ 0 here). Of mainline im-
portance are here explicit justification formulas standing in analogy to classical unexplicit epistemic (modal)
principles like truth and positive introspection, etc. In this section, we present analogue extensions in the con-
text of fuzzy Justification Logic, both model-theoretically, by characterizing the fuzzy versions of the associated
Fitting-models, and axiomatically. We don’t go into surrounding (philosphical) detail about the here studied
principles, however, for an exposition in the classical case, refer to [3].
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4.1. Factivity.
Definition 4.1. We define the following extensions:
(1) GJ T 0 = GJ 0 + (F ) : t : φ→ φ
(2) GJ T CS = GJ CS + (F ) : t : φ→ φ
Definition 4.2. A Go¨del-Justification model M = 〈W,R, e〉 is called reflexive, if ∀w ∈ W : R(w,w) = 1. The
class of all reflexive GJ-models is denoted by GJT.
Proposition 4.3. The scheme t : φ→ φ is valid in the class GJT.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 ∈ GJT and let w ∈ W . Then
e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ inf
v∈W
{R(w, v)⇒ e(v, φ)} ≤ R(w,w)⇒ e(w, φ) = e(w, φ)
where the last equality follows from R(w,w) = 1 f.a. w ∈W , as M is reflexive. 
Similarly as before, we obtain the soundness of GJ T CS (for some CS for GJ T 0) w.r.t. its intended model
class and the proof is thus omitted here.
Lemma 4.4 (Soundness of GJ T CS). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ ⊢GJT CS φ implies Γ |=GJTCS≤ φ.
4.2. Positive introspection.
Definition 4.5. We define the following extensions of GJ CS :
(1) GJ 4CS = GJ CS + (PI) : t : φ→!t : t : φ
(2) GLPCS = GJ T CS + (PI) : t : φ→!t : t : φ
We can now find similar fuzzy analogues to the classical additional properties of Fitting-models regarding
positive introspection.
Definition 4.6. With GJ4, we denote that class of Go¨del-Justification models M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 satisfying
(i) E(t, φ, w) ⊙R(w, v) ≤ E(t, φ, v) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ , w, v ∈W (monotonicity of E w.r.t. R),
(ii) R(w, v) ⊙R(v, u) ≤ R(w, u) f.a. w, v, u ∈ W ((min-)transitivity of R),
(iii) E(t, φ, w) ≤ E(!t, t : φ,w) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ , w ∈W (positive introspectivity of E).
The subclass of all reflexive GJ4-models is denoted respectively with GLP.
Lemma 4.7 (Caicedo, Rodriguez [9]). In a (min-)transitive GJ-model M = 〈W,R, E , e〉, it holds for any
w, v ∈ W and any φ ∈ LJ that e(w,φ) ≤ R(w, v)⇒ e(v,φ).
Proposition 4.8. The scheme t : φ→!t : t : φ is valid in the class GJ4.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 be a GJ4-model and w ∈W . Now, we have
E(t, φ, w) ≤ R(w, v)⇒ E(t, φ, v)
by monotonicity of E over R and properties of the residuum for every v ∈ W . By Lem. 4.7 and monotonicity
of ⊙, we have thus
e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ) ≤ (R(w, v)⇒ E(t, φ, v)) ⊙ (R(w, v)⇒ e(v,φ))
f.a. v ∈W , i.e. we have
e(w, t : φ) ≤ inf
v∈W
{(R(w, v)⇒ E(t, φ, v)) ⊙ (R(w, v)⇒ e(v,φ))} = inf
v∈W
{R(w, v)⇒ (E(t, φ, v) ⊙ e(v,φ))}
and thus, we have e(w, t : φ) ≤ infv∈W {R(w, v)⇒ e(v, t : φ)}. Similarly, we have
e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ,w)
by positive introspecitivty and properties of ⊙. Thus, finally
e(w, t : φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ,w) ⊙ inf
v∈W
{R(w, v)⇒ e(v, t : φ)} = e(w, !t : t : φ)
and therefore e(w, t : φ→!t : t : φ) = 1. 
We thus again readily obtain the following:
Lemma 4.9 (Soundness of GJ 4CS,GLPCS). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we have
(1) Γ ⊢GJ 4CS φ implies Γ |=GJ4CS≤ φ,
(2) Γ ⊢GLPCS φ implies Γ |=GLPCS≤ φ.
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4.3. Negative introspection.
Definition 4.10. We define the following extensions of GJ 4CS:
(1) GJ 45CS = GJ 4CS + (NI) : ¬t : φ→?t : ¬t : φ
(2) GJ T 45CS = GJ 45CS + (F ) : t : φ→ φ
Definition 4.11. The class of GJ4-models satisfying
(i) ∼ E(t, φ, w) ≤ E(?t,¬t : φ,w) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ , w ∈W (negative introspectivity of E),
(ii) E(t, φ, w) ≤ e(w, t : φ) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ , w ∈ W (strong evidence),
is denoted by GJ45. The class of all GJ45-model with reflexive accessibility function is in the following denoted
by GJT45.
Proposition 4.12. The scheme ¬t : φ→?t : ¬t : φ is valid in the model class GJ45.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 be a GJ45-model. We have that
e(w,¬t : φ) =∼ e(w, t : φ) ≤ ∼ E(t, φ, w) (by strong evidence and Lem. 2.2)
≤ E(?t,¬t : φ,w) (by negative introspection)
≤ e(w, ?t : ¬t : φ) (by strong evidence)
for any t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ , w ∈W . 
Lemma 4.13 (Soundness of GJ 45CS,GJ T 45CS). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we have
(1) Γ ⊢GJ 45CS φ implies Γ |=GJ45CS≤ φ,
(2) Γ ⊢GJT 45CS φ implies Γ |=GJT45CS≤ φ.
5. Completeness
In the following, let GJLCS be one of the previously introduced systems of Go¨del-Justification logic for a
given, matching, constant specification, i.e.
GJLCS ∈ {GJ CS ,GJ T CS ,GJ 4CS ,GLPCS ,GJ 45CS,GJ T 45CS}
and let GJLCS be the corresponding class of Go¨del-Justification models (respecting the given constant specifi-
cation) for which we’ve established soundness.
Definition 5.1. We define the language L⋆0 := L0(V ar
⋆) where V ar⋆ = V ar ∪ {φt | φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt}. The
translation function ⋆ : LJ → L
⋆
0 is defined inductively as follows:
⊥ 7→ ⊥
p 7→ p, p ∈ V ar
(φ ∧ ψ) 7→ φ⋆ ∧ ψ⋆
(φ→ ψ) 7→ φ⋆ → ψ⋆
t : φ 7→ φt
Lemma 5.2. ⋆ is a bijection.
The concrete proof is omitted here, however surjectivity follows almost directly by considering a formula in
L⋆0 and replacing every φt by t : φ. The resulting formula naively lies in LJ and has the expected translation as
⋆ distributes over all propositional connectives. Injectivity follows from a simple induction on the structure of
the formulas.
⋆ is naturally extended to sets of formulas via Γ⋆ = {φ⋆ | φ ∈ Γ}.4 We denote by ThGJLCS the set of
theorems of the calculus GJLCS for some constant specification CS, i.e. ThGJLCS = {φ ∈ LJ | ⊢GJLCS φ}.
Lemma 5.3. Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ . Then Γ ⊢GJLCS φ iff Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G φ
⋆.
Proof. We proof both directions separately by strong induction on the length of the proof of φ.
⇒: Suppose that Γ ⊢GJLCS φ.
(IB): If the length of the proof is 1, then either
(i) φ ∈ Γ,
(ii) φ is an axiom of GJLCS , or
(iii) φ was obtained by (CS).
For (i), we have φ⋆ ∈ Γ⋆, from which the claim follows. For (ii), we have that φ ∈ ThGJLCS ,
i.e. φ⋆ ∈ (ThGJLCS )
⋆, which gives the claim. Concerning (iii), we have φ ∈ ThGJLCS , i.e.
φ⋆ ∈ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ as well.
4Note, that L⋆
0
and similarly V ar⋆ from Def. 5.1 are an abuse of notation and do not denote the ⋆-translation of L0 and V ar
respectively. For this, one may write (L0)⋆ or (V ar)⋆.
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(IS): If the length is greater than 1, the last rule in the deduction was essentially (MP ), i.e. Γ ⊢GJLCS ψ
and Γ ⊢GJLCS ψ → φ for some ψ ∈ LJ . We can now apply the induction hypothesis as they have
shorter proofs. Thus, Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G ψ
⋆ and Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G ψ
⋆ → φ⋆. Thus, by (MP )
in G, we deduce Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G φ
⋆.
⇐: Suppose that Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G φ
⋆.
(IB): If the length of the proof is 1, then either
(i) φ⋆ ∈ Γ⋆,
(ii) φ⋆ ∈ (ThGJLCS )
⋆, or
(iii) φ⋆ is an axiom instance in G.
For (i), we have that φ ∈ Γ, i.e. Γ ⊢GJLCS φ, while for (ii), we have that φ ∈ ThGJLCS and thus
⊢GJLCS φ. Finally, if φ
⋆ is an axiom instance in G, then φ, resulting by replacing every occurrence
of some ψt by t : ψ is an instance of the same axiom in GJLCS , hence ⊢GJLCS φ also in this case.
(IS): If the length is greater than 1, the last rule in the deduction was necessarily (MP ), i.e. Γ⋆ ∪
(ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G ψ
⋆ and Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G ψ
⋆ → φ⋆ for some ψ ∈ LJ as ⋆ is bijective between
LJ and L
⋆
0. Now, for the latter, by the definition of ⋆, we have Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ ⊢G (ψ → φ)
⋆. By
the induction hypothesis, as the corresponding proofs are necessarily shorter, we have Γ ⊢GJLCS ψ
and Γ ⊢GJLCS ψ → φ, i.e. by (MP ) in GJLCS we deduce Γ ⊢GJLCS φ.

Definition 5.4 (Canonical model for GJLCS). The canonical model for GJLCS ,M
c(GJLCS) = 〈W
c, Rc, Ec, ec〉,
is defined as follows:
(1) W c = {v ∈ Ev(L⋆0) | v((ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1},
(2) Rc(v, w) =
{
1, if ∀φ ∈ LJ : ∀t ∈ Jt : v(φt) ≤ w(φ
⋆)
0, otherwise
f.a. v, w ∈ W c,
(3) Ec(t, φ, v) = v(φt) f.a. v ∈ W , t ∈ Jt and φ ∈ LJ ,
(4) ec(v, p) = v(p) f.a. v ∈ W c, p ∈ V ar.
ec is extended to LJ as before.
Lemma 5.5 (Truth lemma). Let Mc(GJLCS) = 〈W
c, Rc, Ec, ec〉. For all φ ∈ LJ and any v ∈ W
c: ec(v, φ) =
v(φ⋆).
Proof. Induction on the structure of the formula φ.
(IB): For the base case of φ = p ∈ V ar, we have ec(v, p) = v(p) = v(p⋆) f.a. v ∈ W c. Similarly, for φ = ⊥, we
have ec(v,⊥) = 0 = v(⊥) = v(⊥⋆).
(IS): For the induction step, we divide between the different connectives.
We have, for φ = ψ → χ, that ec(v, ψ → χ) = ec(v, ψ)⇒ ec(v, χ) = v(ψ⋆)⇒ v(χ⋆) = v(ψ⋆ → χ⋆) =
v((ψ → χ)⋆) straightforwardly by (IH).
Similarly, for φ = ψ ∧ χ, we obtain ec(v, ψ ∧ χ) = ec(v, ψ) ⊙ ec(v, χ) = v(ψ⋆) ⊙ v(χ⋆) = v((ψ ∧ χ)⋆)
by (IH) as well.
Hence, we are left with showing that ec(v, t : ψ) = v(ψt) for an arbitrary v ∈ W
c, i.e. we are left to
show that
v(ψt) = E
c(t, ψ, v)⊙ ec(v,ψ) = v(ψt)⊙ e
c(v,ψ)
as Ec(t, ψ, v) = v(ψt) per definition. Thus, it suffices to show that e
c(v,ψ) ≥ v(ψt) by the laws of
⊙ = min. Now, by (IH), we have ec(w,ψ) = w(ψ⋆) for any w ∈ W c and thus
ec(v,ψ) = inf
w∈W c
{Rc(v, w)⇒ ec(w,ψ)} = inf
w∈W c
{Rc(v, w)⇒ w(ψ⋆)}.
As Rc is crisp, we now have infw∈W c{R
c(v, w) ⇒ w(ψ⋆)} = inf{w(ψ⋆) | w ∈ W c, Rc(v, w) = 1}. Now,
for all w ∈ W c s.t. Rc(v, w) = 1, we have v(ψt) ≤ w(ψ
⋆), i.e.
v(ψt) ≤ inf{w(ψ
⋆) | Rc(v, w) = 1} = ec(v,ψ).
Thus ec(v, t : ψ) = v(ψt)⊙ e
c(v,ψ) = min{v(ψt), e
c(v,ψ)} = v(ψt).

Lemma 5.6. Mc(GJLCS) = 〈W
c, Rc, Ec, ec〉 has the strong evidence property, i.e.
Ec(t, φ, v) ≤ ec(v, t : φ)
for all v ∈ W c, φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt.
Proof. By the Truth lemma 5.5 and the definition of Mc(GJLCS), we have E
c(t, φ, v) = v(φt) = e
c(v, t : φ). 
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Note, that for a GJ-model M = 〈W,R, E , e〉, the strong evidence property E(t, φ, w) ≤ e(w, t : φ) is obviously
equivalent with the stronger assertion E(t, φ, w) = e(w, t : φ) as e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w,φ) ≤ E(t, φ, w)
follows anyway by properties of ⊙.
Lemma 5.7. Mc(GJLCS) is a well-defined GJLCS-model.
Proof. Let Mc(GJLCS) = 〈W
c, Rc, Ec, ec〉. We divide between the different possibilities for GJLCS:
GJCS : We just need to check the three basic conditions on E
c. Let v ∈W c be arbitrary:
(i) As v((ThGJCS )
⋆) = 1, we have v((φ → ψ)t → (φs → ψ[t·s])) = 1, i.e. v((φ → ψ)t) ≤ v(φs) ⇒
v(ψ[t·s]) and thus v((φ → ψ)t) ⊙ v(φs) ≤ v(ψ[t·s]). Thus, we have E(t, φ → ψ, v) ⊙ E(s, φ, v) ≤
E(t · s, ψ, v) by definition of Mc.
(ii) Again as v((ThGJCS )
⋆) = 1, we have v(φt → φ[t+s]) = 1 and v(φs → φ[t+s]) = 1, i.e. v(φt) ≤
v(φ[t+s]) and v(φs) ≤ v(φ[t+s]). Thus immediately E(t, φ, v), E(s, φ, v) ≤ E(t + s, φ, v), i.e.
E(t, φ, v) ⊕ E(s, φ, v) ≤ E(t+ s, φ, v).
(iii) Let c : φ ∈ CS. Then c : φ ∈ ThGJCS by (CS) in GJ CS , i.e. φc ∈ (ThGJCS )
⋆ and thus for any
v ∈W c, we have v(φc) = 1, i.e. E
c(c, φ, v) = 1 for all v ∈W c.
GJTCS : We have R
c(v, v) = 1 iff ∀φ ∈ LJ : ∀t ∈ Jt : v(φt) ≤ v(φ
⋆) which follows, as v((ThGJT CS )
⋆) = 1, i.e.
we have that v(φt → φ
⋆) = 1 by axiom (F ), i.e. v(φt) ⇒ v(φ
⋆) = 1, thus v(φt) ≤ v(φ
⋆) f.a. t ∈ Jt
and any φ ∈ LJ . The rest follows as in the GJCS-case.
GJ4CS : We check the three additional conditions of GJ4-models from Def. 4.6. The rest follows similarly to
the GJCS-case.
(i) Let v, w ∈ W c. If w(φt) = E
c(t, φ, w) ≤ E(t, φ, v) = v(φt), the inequality is immediately
satisfied. Thus, suppose that w(φt) > v(φt). But as v, w ∈ W
c, we have v(φt) ≤ v((t : φ)!t)
and w(φt) ≤ w((t : φ)!t), i.e. v(φt) < w(φt) ≤ w((t : φ)!t), i.e. v(φt) < w((t : φ)!t). Thus
∃ψ ∈ LJ , s ∈ Jt s.t. v(ψ
⋆) < w(ψs). Thus, we have R
c(w, v) = 0 in this case.
(ii) Let w, v, u ∈ W c. As Rc is crisp, we have that either Rc(w, v) ⊙ Rc(v, u) = 0 or Rc(w, v) ⊙
Rc(v, u) = 1. For the former, the inequality is trivially satisfied. Thus suppose Rc(w, v) ⊙
Rc(v, u) = 1, i.e. Rc(w, v) = Rc(v, u) = 1 and thus
∀φ ∈ LJ : ∀t ∈ Jt : w(φt) ≤ v(φ
⋆)
and
∀φ ∈ LJ : ∀t ∈ Jt : v(φt) ≤ u(φ
⋆).
Let φ ∈ LJ and t ∈ Jt be arbitrary. Then, by monotonicity, i.e. item (i), we have that
Ec(t, φ, w)⊙Rc(w, v) ≤ Ec(t, φ, v), i.e. as Rc(w, v) = 1 we have w(φt) = E
c(t, φ, w) ≤ Ec(t, φ, v) =
v(φt). Thus, we have w(φt) ≤ v(φt) ≤ u(φ
⋆). The claim follows as φ and t were arbitrary.
(iii) For any w ∈ W c, as w((ThGJ 4CS )
⋆) = 1, we have w(φt → (t : φ)!t) = 1 for any φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt,
i.e. Ec(t, φ, w) = w(φt) ≤ w((t : φ)!t) = E
c(!t, t : φ,w) for any φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt.
GLPCS : For GLPCS , as shown in the GJTCS-case, the presence of the axiom (F ) makes the accessibility
relation reflexive. The other properties of a GLPCS-model follow from the GJ4CS-case.
GJ45CS : As of Lem. 5.6, the canonical model has the strong evidence property in any case. We thus just
check the negative introspection property: Let w ∈ W c, i.e. w(¬φt → (¬t : φ)?t) = 1, i.e. ∼ w(φt) ≤
w((¬t : φ)?t) and thus ∼ E
c(t, φ, w) ≤ Ec(?t,¬t : φ,w) for any φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt. The other properties
follow from the GJ4CS-case.
GJT45CS: Again, through the GJTCS-case, the presence of axiom (F ) makes the accessibility function reflexive.
The other properties of a GJT45CS-model thus follows from the GJ45CS-case.

Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of the paper, establishing strong completeness for all the
introduced model classes and proof systems.
Theorem 5.8 (Completeness of GJLCS). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(i) Γ ⊢GJLCS φ
(ii) Γ |=GJLCS≤ φ
(iii) Γ |=GJLCS φ
(iv) Γ |=GJLCSc φ
Proof. We have (i) ⇒ (ii) for each case GJ CS ,GJ T CS ,GJ 4CS,GLPCS ,GJ 45CS,GJ T 45CS by Lem. 3.17,
Lem. 4.4, Lem. 4.9, Lem. 4.13 respectively. (ii) ⇒ (iii) follows by Lem. 3.5 in any case, and as GJLCSc is a
subclass of GJLCS for every case, we also have (iii) ⇒ (iv). Thus, it suffices to prove (iv) ⇒ (i).
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For this, assume that Γ 6⊢GJLCS φ. By Lem. 5.3, this is equivalent with Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢G φ
⋆. By strong
standard completeness of G, there is an evaluation v : L⋆0 → [0, 1] s.t. v(Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1 but v(φ⋆) < 1.
By the former, we have v((ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1 and thus v ∈ W c. By the Truth Lemma 5.5 for Mc(GJLCS), we
thus have, by v(Γ⋆) = 1, that ec(v,Γ) = 1 and by v(φ⋆) < 1, we have ec(v, φ) < 1. By Lem. 5.7, Mc(GJLCS) is
a well-defined crisp GJLCS-model s.t. (M
c(GJLCS), v) |= Γ but (M
c(GJLCS), v) 6|= φ for v ∈ D(M
c(GJ LCS)).
Thus Γ 6|=GJLCSc φ. 
We thus find that an analogue of the symmetry-property for the accessibility function is not required to
establish completeness of GJ 45CS and GJ T 45CS w.r.t to their intended semantics, similarly to the classical
boolean case.
We may also derive various corollaries from the strong completeness theorem.
Corollary 5.9 (Model existence). Let Γ ⊆ LJ . If Γ is consistent w.r.t. GJLCS , then ∃M ∈ GJLCS, w ∈ D(M) :
(M, w) |= Γ.
Proof. Suppose Γ is consistent in GJLCS , i.e. Γ 6⊢GJLCS ⊥ and thus by Lem. 5.3, we have Γ
⋆∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢G
⊥. Thus, by strong standard completeness of G, we have Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ 6|=G ⊥, i.e. ∃v ∈ Ev(L
⋆
0) : v(Γ
⋆ ∪
(ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1. Thus, for this v, v((ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1, i.e. v ∈ D(Mc(GJ LCS)) and v(Γ
⋆) = 1. By,
the Truth Lemma 5.5, we have ec(v,Γ) = 1. By Lem. 5.7, Mc(GJLCS) is a well-defined GJLCS-models s.t.
(Mc(GJLCS), v) |= Γ. 
We may also utilize the completeness theorem to show a strong form of conservativity of GJLCS , over G.
Corollary 5.10 (Conservativity). Let GJLCS ∈ {GJ CS,GJ T CS,GJ 4CS,GLPCS} and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0. If
Γ ⊢GJLCS φ, then Γ ⊢G φ.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6⊢G φ. By strong standard completeness of G, Thm. 2.7, we have Γ 6|= φ, i.e. ∃eˆ ∈ Ev(L0) :
eˆ(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ but eˆ(φ) < 1. We now construct a particular GJLCS-model, which encodes this faulty
evaluation:
Let M = 〈W,R, E , e〉 be defined over
• W = {w},
• R(w,w) = 1,
• E(t, α, w) = 1 for all t ∈ Jt, α ∈ LJ ,
• e(w, p) = eˆ(p) for all p ∈ V ar.
As E(t, α, w) = 1 for any choice of t and α, it clearly respects CS. Also, as all such entries of the evidence
function are equal, we have
E(t, φ→ ψ,w)⊙ E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t · s, ψ, w),
E(t, φ, w) ⊕ E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t+ s, φ, w),
E(t, φ, w) ≤ E(!t, t : φ,w).
R is trivially reflexive and (min-)transitive. As W is a singleton, we have monotonicty directly as well. Now,
we can prove:
For any α ∈ L0 : e(w,α) = eˆ(α).
As an induction base, for α = p ∈ V ar, we have e(w, p) = eˆ(p) and also e(w,⊥) = 0 = eˆ(⊥) per definition. The
induction step for ∧ and → follows from a straightforward application of the induction hypothesis.
Now, with M, we’ve found (in each case) a GJLCS-model s.t. e(w,ψ) = eˆ(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ as Γ ⊆ L0 but
e(w, φ) = eˆ(φ) < 1. Thus, per definition, Γ 6|=GJLCS φ and thus by Thm. 5.8, we have Γ 6⊢GJLCS φ 
6. An alternative semantics over fuzzy Mkrtychev models
Introduced in [30], Mkrtychev models preceded Kripke-Fitting semantics for Justification Logics. From
their perspective, Mkrtychev models essentially encode the necessary information concerning the justification
modalities only via the admissible evidence function. In the following, we present Go¨del-Mkrtychev models for
our various Go¨del-Justification Logics for which we proof another strong completeness theorem. Again, in the
following, let GJLCS ∈ {GJ CS ,GJ T CS ,GJ 4CS ,GLPCS,GJ 45CS,GJ T 45CS}.
Definition 6.1. A Go¨del-Mkrtychev model is a structure M = 〈E , e〉 with
(1) E : Jt× LJ → [0, 1],
(2) e : V ar → [0, 1],
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where we have the following conditions on the corresponding admissible evidence function E :
(i) E(t, φ→ ψ)⊙ E(s, φ) ≤ E(t · s, ψ),
(ii) E(t, φ) ⊕ E(s, φ) ≤ E(t+ s, φ),
for all t, s ∈ Jt and φ, ψ ∈ LJ .
e extends to LJ via the following recursive rules:
• e(⊥) = 0
• e(φ ∧ ψ) = e(φ)⊙ e(ψ)
• e(φ→ ψ) = e(φ)⇒ e(ψ)
• e(t : φ) = E(t, φ)
It can be seen that, naively, Go¨del-Mkrtychev models can be identified with single-world Go¨del-Fitting models
with a nulled accessibility function. A Go¨del-Mkrtychev model respects a constant specification CS if
E(c, φ) = 1 for all c : φ ∈ CS.
We denote the class of all Go¨del-Mkrtychev models (all Go¨del-Mkrtychev respecting a constant specification
CS) by GM,GMCS respectively.
Definition 6.2. Let M = 〈E , e〉 be a GM-model and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ . We say
(i) φ is valid in M, written M |= φ, iff e(φ) = 1,
(ii) Γ is valid in M, written M |= Γ, iff ∀ψ ∈ Γ : M |= ψ.
For C a class of GM-models, we say
(iii) φ is a consequence of Γ in C, written Γ |=M
C≤ φ, iff ∀M ∈ C : e(Γ) = infψ∈Γ{e(ψ)} ≤ e(φ),
(iv) φ is a 1-consequence of Γ in C, written Γ |=M
C
φ, iff ∀M ∈ C : M |= Γ implies M |= φ.
Definition 6.3. We call a Go¨del-Mkrtychev model M = 〈E , e〉 satisfying
(1) E(t, φ) ≤ e(φ) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ a GMT-model,
(2) E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ a GM4-model,
(3) (1) and (2) a GMLP-model,
(4) (2) and ∼ E(t, φ) ≤ E(?t,¬t : φ) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ a GM45-model,
(5) (1) and (4) a GMT45-model.
For any choice of a Go¨del-Justification Logic represented by GJLCS , let GMJLCS represent the associated
class of Go¨del-Mkrtychev models.
Lemma 6.4. For a constant specification CS for GJL0, the rule (CS) is valid in the class of GMJLCS-models.
Proof. Let M = 〈E , e〉 be a GMJLCS-model and let c : φ ∈ CS. Then, as M respects CS, we have E(c, φ) = 1,
i.e. e(c : φ) = 1 per definition for the extended e. 
Lemma 6.5 (Soundness for GM-models). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ ⊢GJLCS φ implies Γ |=
M
GMJLCS≤
φ.
Proof. We divide between the different cases for GJLCS . Also, we just check the validity of the axioms, the
rest follows from Lem. 6.4 as before.
GJ CS : To see that (J) is valid, observe that e(t : (φ→ ψ))⊙ e(s : φ) = E(t, φ→ ψ)⊙E(s, φ) ≤ E(t · s, ψ) =
e([t · s] : ψ). By properties of the residuum, we have e(t : (φ → ψ)) ≤ e(s : φ) ⇒ e([t · s] : ψ), i.e.
e(t : (φ→ ψ)) ≤ e(s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ).
To see that (+) is valid, note that e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) ≤ E(t + s, φ) = e([t+ s] : φ), similarly for the
other version.
GJ T CS : Naturally, we have e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) ≤ e(φ), i.e. e(t : φ→ φ) = 1 by the conditions on GMT-models.
The rest follows from the GJ CS-case.
GJ 4CS : We have that e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) = e(!t : t : φ) by the condition of GM4-models. The
rest follows again from the GJ CS-case.
GLPCS : This case follows entirely from the GJ T CS and GJ 4CS cases.
GJ 45CS : We have e(¬t : φ) =∼ e(t : φ) =∼ E(t, φ) ≤ E(?t,¬t : φ) = e(?t : ¬t : φ), i.e. e(¬t : φ →?t : ¬t :
φ) = 1. The rest follows from the GJ 4CS-case.
GJ T 45CS: Again, the cases for GJ 45CS and GJ T CS directly imply this one.

Definition 6.6. Let v ∈ Ev(L⋆0) be s.t. v((ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1. We define the canonical Go¨del-Mkrtychev model
of GJLCS w.r.t v, M
c
v(GJLCS) = 〈E
c, ec〉 over
(1) Ec(t, φ) = v(φt) for all φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt,
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(2) ec(p) = v(p) for all p ∈ V ar.
Lemma 6.7. Let Mcv(GJLCS) = 〈E
c, ec〉 be the canonical Mkrtychev-model of GJLCS w.r.t to v. For all
φ ∈ LJ : e
c(φ) = v(φ⋆).
Proof. Induction on the structure of φ:
(IB): Let φ = p ∈ V ar, then ec(p) = v(p) = v(p⋆) per definition. If φ = ⊥, then ec(⊥) = 0 = v(⊥) = v(⊥⋆)
per definition for the extension of an evaluation function.
(IS): We again divide between the different connectives of LJ :
For φ = ψ → χ and φ = ψ ∧ χ, the claim follows again directly from (IH), as we have e.g.
ec(ψ ∧ χ) = ec(ψ)⊙ ec(χ) = v(ψ⋆)⊙ v(χ⋆) = v(ψ⋆ ∧ χ⋆) = v((ψ ∧ χ)⋆) and similarly for →.
In comparison to Lem. 5.5, the claim for φ = t : ψ is even more straightforward, as we just have
ec(t : ψ) = Ec(t, ψ) = v(ψt) = v((t : ψ)
⋆) per definition.

Lemma 6.8. Mcv(GJLCS) is a well-defined GMJLCS-model for any choice of v.
We omit the proof as it is essentially a replica of the proof of Lem. 5.7.
Theorem 6.9. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(i) Γ ⊢GJLCS φ
(ii) Γ |=M
GMJLCS≤
φ
(iii) Γ |=M
GMJLCS
φ
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) follows from Lem. 6.5 and (ii) ⇒ (iii) follows naturally as before. Thus, we show (iii) ⇒
(i). For this, suppose Γ 6⊢GJLCS φ. Thus, by Lem. 5.3, we have Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢G φ
⋆. By strong standard
completeness of G, we have that ∃v ∈ Ev(L⋆0) : v(Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1 and v(φ⋆) < 1. Now, considering
M
c
v(GJLCS) = 〈E
c, ec〉, we have by the Truth Lemma 6.7, that ec(Γ) = 1 and ec(φ) < 1. By Lem. 6.8, we have
that Mcv(GJLCS) is a well-defined GMJLCS-model. Thus Γ 6|=GMJLCS φ. 
Corollary 6.10 (Model existence). Let Γ ⊆ LJ . If Γ is consistent in GJLCS , then ∃M ∈ GMJLCS : M |= Γ.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6⊢GJLCS ⊥, i.e. by Lem. 5.3 Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢G ⊥. By strong standard completeness of G,
we have Γ⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆ 6|=G ⊥. Thus, ∃v ∈ Ev(L
⋆
0) : v(Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1. Thus, as v((ThGJLCS )
⋆) = 1,
M
c
v(GJLCS) is a well-defined GMJLCS-model by Lem. 6.8 with v(Γ
⋆) = 1. By the Truth Lemma 6.7, we have
ec(Γ) = 1. 
We may derive a conservativity result for one of the remaining logics GJ 45CS easier over the completeness
theorem with respect to Mkrtychev models.
Corollary 6.11 (Conservativity of GJ 45CS). Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0. If Γ ⊢GJ 45CS φ, then Γ ⊢G φ.
Proof. Let Γ 6⊢G φ. By Thm. 2.7, we have Γ 6|= φ, i.e. ∃eˆ ∈ Ev(L0) : eˆ(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ with eˆ(φ) < 1. We
consider the following GM45CS-model M = 〈E , e〉:
• E(t, α) = 1 for all t ∈ Jt and α ∈ LJ
• e(p) = eˆ(p) for p ∈ V ar
E clearly respects CS as before and it naively satisfies the sum and application laws for basic GM-models. Also,
E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) trivially follows and similarly direct, we have ∼ E(t, φ) = 0 ≤ 1 = E(?t,¬t : φ). As before,
we may prove e(φ) = eˆ(φ) for any φ ∈ L0 and thus we’ve found a GM45CS-model M s.t. M |= Γ and M 6|= φ.
Thus Γ 6|=M
GM45CS
φ and by the Completeness Theorem 6.9, we thus have Γ 6⊢GJ 45CS φ. 
A construction of such a counter-model for the remaining logic GJ T 45CS seems to be possible as well.
However, a concrete initial advance proved itself to be rather complicated through the regularity condition
E(t, φ) ≤ e(φ) and we thus leave this as future work.
7. Conclusions and further directions
In this note, we exhibited fuzzy analogies to concepts from Justification Logic. More specifically, we replaced
classical boolean propositional logic with Go¨del fuzzy logic as a base for the modal extensions of Justification
Logic. With this, we translated the common semantical approach via Kripke-Fitting possible world semantics
to a many-valued setting and, in difference to previous approaches to fuzzy Justification Logic, we considered
models with a fuzzy accessibility function. We then provided Hilbert-style axiomatic proof systems for the re-
sulting analogous model classes of the most common representatives of classical Justification Logic and proved
a strong standard completeness theorem for all of them and deduced various corollaries in the following. With
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Go¨del-Mkrtychev models, we also translated a second semantical access point to Justification Logic besides the
Kripke-Fitting approach into the setting of Go¨del logic for which we provided a second strong completeness
theorem for the here introduced proof systems, which is another similarity Go¨del-Justification Logic bears with
the classical version.
However besides of the here established results, this paper is only one of a few regarding the topic of fuzzy
Justification Logics and there remain a lot of interesting question yet still to be answered. In the following, we
give pointers to some of the possible directions.
7.1. Forgetful projection and realization. A very prominent result in the classical case is the realization
and projection theorems by Artemov, relating a Justification Logic to a classical modal counterpart in the sense
that for every theorem of
(1) the classical modal proof calculus, there exists an assignment of justification terms to the occurrences
of the standard necessity modality  s.t. the resulting formula is a theorem in the calculus of the
Justification Logic, (Realization),
(2) the Justification proof calculus, replacing every justification modality by the standard necessity operator
 results in a theorem of the classical modal calculus, (Forgetful Projection).
For the systems G, G +T, G + 4 and G +T + 4 established in [9] and the systems GJ CS , GJ T CS ,
GJ 4CS and GLPCS respectively, introduced in this paper, the Forgetful Projection property follows immedi-
ately. It shall be very interesting to see as of if and how the Realization Theorem can be proved in the case of
Go¨del-Justification Logic and standard Go¨del modal logic.
7.2. Adding the Baaz-Delta and truth constants. One common extension to Go¨del (or in general fuzzy)
logics is the Baaz-Delta operator ∆, introduced by Baaz in [4] as a unary crisp projection operator stipulated
over the truth function δ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with
δ(x) =
{
1, if x = 1
0, otherwise
In plain Go¨del logic, this operator is not definable and thus adds expressive strength. Another common exten-
sion is the incorporation of countably many truth-value constants into the language, i.e. adding formulas of the
form c¯ for c ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1] for a countable C and stipulating an evaluation of c¯ in every case as its represented
value c. These extensions, especially in combination with one another, are by now well-studied in the framework
of basic propositional mathematical fuzzy logic, see e.g. [12].
As an advantage in the case of Go¨del-Justification logic, besides gaining general expressive strength, it might
also be interesting to consider graded justification assertions, that is formulas of the type
t :c φ := c¯→ t : φ
t :c φ := t : φ→ c¯
t
c
: φ := t :c φ ∧ t :
c φ
for truth constants c¯ with the intuitive reading of having at least, at most and exactly a certainty degree of
c of regarding t as a justification of φ. These were already studied by Ghari in [18], [19] in the context of
Justification Logic over rational Pavelka logic and considered conceptually different before also by Milnikel in
[29]. The additional presence of the crisp projection ∆ might even create various other possibilities for internal
definitions of model-theoretically interesting justification assertions.
7.3. Using other fuzzy logics as a base. Among the other prominent representatives for systems of mathe-
matical fuzzy logic, Go¨del logic is in general a well-behaved example (e.g. being the only instance enjoying the
classical deduction theorem), as this paper additionally exhibits through the similarity of Go¨del-Justification
logic to many classical cases. However, for future work it might be interesting to consider these other com-
mon examples as choices of bases for Justification Logic. Investigations in this already include Ghari’s work
[19], where he studies the case of using rational Pavelka logic, i.e.  Lukasiewicz logic with truth constants r¯ for
every r ∈ [0, 1]∩Q. But also  Lukasiewicz logic alone as well as Product logic shall be very interesting to consider.5
As however already exhibited in [32], [7] and e.g. [31], etc., these logics prove themselves already to be quite
untamed in the context of classical modal operators, as e.g. the modal axiom (K)
(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)
5As said before, in [18], Ghari already exhibited the basics of some of these various other systems over crisp frames.
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is no longer valid over the class of all corresponding Kripke models with fuzzy accessibility function. It should
be interesting to see how these logics cooperate with an extension in the spirit of Justification Logic, both in
fuzzy-framed and crisp-framed models and if they are respectively strongly axiomatizable.
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